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Mijnheer de Rector, waarde collega’s, zeer gewaarde toehoorders.
During the last 60 years many myths about development have been 
exploded through sober empirical analysis and measurement of 
development trends. Developing countries are not inevitably condemned 
to poverty and stagnation. Life expectancy at birth has increased by 
some 25 years. Child mortality has declined and human capital has 
increased. Contrary to Malthusian predictions, food production has 
outpaced a rapidly growing global population, especially in densely 
populated developing countries. Developing countries are not locked 
into agriculture and mining. They can become powerful global players in 
manufacturing production and exports. Table 1 summarises a number of 
these dramatic changes. However, it also serves to highlight how many 
people are still living in dire poverty..
Table 1: Dynamic Changes in the Developing World, 1950-2005
  1950-60 1981 2000-05
GDP per capita (1990 PPP$), 1950, 2003 854.9  3645.6
Food production per capita (1980 = 100) 88.0  147.0
Manufactured exports as % of commodity exports 6.0  53.0
Life expectancy at birth 40.8  65.4
Child mortality by age 1 180.0  65.0
Child mortality by age 5 281.0  95.0
Gross Enrolment Rate primary education 75.8  103.9
Gross Enrolment Rate secondary education 15.7  58.3
Gross Enrolment Rate tertiary education 2.1  13.0
Net Enrolment Rate primary education 48.1  82.0
Net Enrolment Rate secondary education 35.0  45.0
Percentage of population, with less than 1 dollar a day  40.4 21.1
Number of persons with less than 1 dollar a day  1481.8 1092.7
Percentage of population, with less than 2 dollars a day  66.8 52.9
Number of persons with less than 2 dollars a day  2449.8 2735.5
Sources: Szirmai (2007): www.dynamicsofdevelopment.com;
GDP per capita from Maddison, 2007
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Diversity of country experiences
One of the most striking phenomena in the study of development is 
the diversity of developing country experiences, especially since the oil 
shock of 1973. In Asia, several countries have experienced rapid growth 
and catch up, including Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Many Latin American economies grew rapidly until 1980, but their 
growth momentum has faltered since 1973 and their prospects are 
uncertain. With the exception of tiny countries such as Mauritius and 
Botswana and the exceptional case of South Africa, African countries 
have by and large experienced long-run stagnation since 1973, after a 
period of growth between 1950 and 1973. In the Middle East, economic 
performance of most countries has been weak, in spite of vast oil 
resources. Few of the oil-rich countries have been able to use their 
mineral resources to generate sustainable growth in other sectors of 
the economy. As a result of these divergent trends, developing countries 
that had similar levels of per capita income in the 1950s, such as e.g. 
Ghana and Thailand, now show vast differences in levels of economic 
development (Lal and Myint, 1996). These divergent trends are illustrated 
in the following three figures.
Figure 1: 
GDP per capita (1990 PPP$) in Asia and Africa,
(South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Ghana, Tanzania),  1950-2006
Sources: 1950-1990, Maddison (2007); 1990-2006: GGDC, 2007
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Figure 2:
GDP per Capita (1990 PPP$) in Oil Rich Countries
Indonesia and Nigeria, 1950-2005
Sources: 1950-1990, Maddison (2007); 1990-2006: GGDC, 2007
Figure 3:
GDP per capita (1990 PPP$) in Asia and Latin America
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, 1950-2005
Sources: 1950-1990, Maddison (2007); 1990-2006: GGDC, 2007
In this lecture, I will explore what we can learn from these diverse 
experiences and the wealth of empirical studies about them.1 Can we 
1  The lecture is an attempt to summarise, synthesize and further develop the insights from 
my textbook The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development, CUP, 2005. The empirical data 
underlying the arguments are included in the book. Updates of these data are provided on 
the website: http://www.dynamicsofdevelopment.com
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come up with systematic explanations of relative success and failure in 
socio-economic development, or does it all remain a mystery or a matter 
of luck? To what extent can we assess future trends on the basis of past 
experiences?
The Failure of Monocausal Explanations
Explaining economic development is not for the simpleminded. The first 
observation that one can make is a negative one: every single mono-
causal explanation ever advanced for development falls down in the 
face of the empirical evidence. 
Max Weber explained the breakthrough of capitalism in North 
Western Europe from the religious characteristics of the Protestantism. 
But, Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic cannot cope with the recent economic 
success of Confucian countries
Differences in degrees of corruption cannot explain why some 
countries stagnate and others develop. Some countries and regions 
such as present-day China or Indonesia under Suharto prosper in 
spite of pervasive corruption, while others suffer deeply. Some types of 
corruption seem to be economically sustainable. 
Climatic and geographic determinists such as Jeffrey Sachs or Jared 
Diamond cannot account for the phenomenal success of landlocked 
economies such as Switzerland, Austria, Botswana or rapid growth in 
tropical regions such as Malaysia, Thailand or Southern China.
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have shown how countries can achieve 
phenomenal economic development with scarce natural resources. 
Coal, steel and oil are not essential for successful development. Oil and 
mineral resources have often – but again not always - turned out to be 
a bane for economic development, as in the case of Nigeria, Congo or 
Venezuela, but less so in the case of Indonesia, Qatar or Botswana.
Capital accumulation is an ingredient of every conceivable 
development strategy. But high rates of investment are no guarantee 
for sustained growth of per capita output or total factor productivity. 
If the capacity to absorb investment is lacking, mobilising national or 
international resources for investment results in waste and inefficiency.
Human capital seems to be important in successful development 
experiences. But many African developing countries have achieved great 
success in expanding their education systems, without the corollary of 
economic growth (Pack and Paxson, 2001). 
Protection of property rights has often been advanced as a key 
precondition for innovation, technological change and economic 
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progress (North and Thomas, 1973). But the case of China since 1978 
illustrates that explosive growth and catch up can coexist with weak 
intellectual property rights and weakly defined property rights in 
general (Qian, 2003). To much emphasis on institutions, results in what 
Rodrik (2006) has called institutional fundamentalism. Either failures 
of reform can be explained away, because reform has never gone far 
enough, or the difficulty of achieving institutional reform becomes an 
excuse for inaction.
Marxist and other theories of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation 
fail to explain why some former colonies break the mould of dependence 
and stagnation and emerge as dynamic economies, and others do 
not. Why did the USA become the world productivity leader while 
Brazil and Argentina have remained developing countries, though their 
decolonisation was only a few decades apart? 
Much has been made of good economic policies. It is certainly true 
that disastrous policies such as those of Zimbabwe's Mugabe or 
Indonesia's Sukarno can wreck a country. But apart from that policy 
variables such as openness to foreign investment, macroeconomic 
policies, price distortions, financial policies, and trade openness do not 
have predictable and robust effects on growth rates (Rodrik, 2006).
The first insight that follows from this is that it is seldom single 
factors, which explain breakthroughs and successes in development. 
Rather, it is the interaction of many complementary internal and external 
factors and determinants and the timing of these interactions. 
Next, it would seem that older development economists such as 
Hirschman, Gerschenkron, Myrdal and Geertz are right. In his still 
eminently readable book Strategy of Economic Development (1958), 
Alfred Hirschman argues that one cannot compile a fixed list of 
‘prerequisites’ for economic development, which would automatically 
result in economic success. There may be functional alternatives for the 
so-called prerequisites, and the prerequisites may vary in time and space. 
In a similar vein, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz argued in Peddlers 
and Princes (1963) that almost any religion and culture has elements 
which under given circumstances can promote growth and in other 
circumstances can block it. Since Kemal Atatürk, Islam is often referred to 
as a cultural obstacle to economic development, but Geertz documented 
the dynamic entrepreneurial attitudes amongst devout Indonesian 
Muslims as his prime example. Also, in present day Turkey, devout 
Muslims from Anatolia are a dynamic economic and entrepreneurial 
force in modern Turkey. In different ways, both Gerschenkron and 
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Myrdal highlighted the importance of changing initial conditions, as a 
result of which processes of development are never the same as earlier 
processes.
Rather than a fixed list of prerequisites or causal determinants, it 
sometimes appears that it is simply success that generates further 
success. Once dynamic processes of economic and technological change 
have been set in motion, these mobilise and call forth new talents and 
resources, which contribute to further development. Once growth is 
underway, economic success becomes path dependent and it seems as 
if new opportunities create further opportunities and policy makers can 
hardly do anything wrong, as in current China. The sources of growth 
in successful development experiences may differ, but whatever the 
sources, success feeds upon itself in what Myrdal (1968) referred to as 
cumulative causation.
On the other hand, once development stagnates, as a result of 
external shocks, misguided policies, political instability or bad luck, 
it may be very difficult to get things moving again, as evidenced by 
Indonesia after the Asian crisis of 1997 and Sub-Saharan Africa after the 
1973 oil shock. Failure feeds on failure, just as much as success feeds on 
success.
This notion of path dependence is further elaborated in modern 
evolutionary economics, which suggests that small initial differences 
are reinforced over time. Small initial changes set in motion cumulative 
process of growth and decline which cannot be predicted in advance, 
especially as the initial conditions for development are different in every 
region and historical period.
The rather unsatisfactory corollary of this is that successful 
development might just be a matter of luck and that we cannot learn 
all that much from successful development experiences in the past. 
It is my conviction, however, that we should be able to do better than 
that on the basis of the empirical record. Though historical experiences 
are never repeated in unchanged form, though initial conditions differ 
and though development patterns are seldom identical, we can learn 
from a systematic empirical analysis of past experiences of growth and 
stagnation. 
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Long-Run Divergence and Increasing Fluidity in the International Order
The technology race in long-run perspective: divergence of levels of per 
capita income.
Development needs to be studied in the context of a changing 
international economic and political order. One can conceive of the 
international economic order as an arena for a technology race, where 
countries and regions compete with each other over decades and 
centuries in terms of technology, productivity, GDP per capita and 
standards of living. In the long run these phenomena are closely linked. 
Technological advance fuels productivity growth. Growth of productive 
capacity translates into growth of per capita incomes and improving 
standards of living, health and education.2
In the World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (2001) and other 
publications, Angus Maddison has charted and quantified the long-run 
development of the world economic order. In Europe the acceleration of 
growth dates back to the fourteenth century, when Europe overtook the 
incumbent technological leader China.3 From the fourteenth century 
onward, Europe experienced a long-run increase in per capita incomes, 
which also spread to the Western Offshoots. Since 1820, per capita 
incomes in the Western world have increased 20-fold (Maddison, 2007, 
p. 70). As other regions and countries did not participate to the same 
extent in this growth process, global divergence increased. 
Among the unique characteristics of this long-run growth process 
are the dual nature of sustained internal growth and five hundred years 
of external economic and political expansion of the Western world. This 
resulted in the creation of a single interdependent world economic order, 
but not a global empire. The length of the Western growth experience 
contrasts with earlier cyclical economic movements of growth and 
decline. 
International interdependence reached a peak in the period 1870-13 
(whether measured by foreign investment, people flows, or trade 
flows). Global interdependencies were temporarily reduced in the 
2  In this lecture, I do not touch upon the increasingly pressing issues of global environmental 
sustainability. Given the immense problems of poverty, malnutrition and non-fulfilment 
of basic needs, setting the dynamics of growth and economic development in motion re-
mains the most urgent priority for poor developing countries. The advanced economies, 
which are responsible for the lions’ share of global pollution and global warming, should 
take the lead in making global growth more sustainable.
3  Maddison dates the overtaking of China by Europe a century earlier than previous obser-
vers have done.
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autarkic period between the two world wars of the twentieth century 
Globalisation picked up again after 1950, though it was only in the 1970s 
that globalisation reached levels similar to those of 1913. 
Post-war globalisation differs in at least two interesting respects 
from the earlier globalisation process. The first wave of globalisation 
coincided with the imperial expansion of the Western countries. The 
second wave of globalisation took place in the context of political 
decolonisation and western contraction, which started in the Middle 
East in the 1930s and was completed in 1989 when majority rule was 
achieved in South Africa. Next, the earlier global division of labour 
primarily expressed itself in flows of products, with developing countries 
exporting primary products to the advanced and advanced economies 
exporting manufactured goods to the developing world. The present 
globalisation trend involves deeper forms of functional integration. 
The international division of labour now revolves around the relocation 
of stages of the global value chain rather than final products (Dicken, 
2003) and a key role for multinational companies in managing global 
trade.
Fluidity: long-run shifts in leadership
The growth of the world economy and the evolution of the international 
order were accompanied by shifts in technological and economic 
leadership. Technological leadership shifted from China to Southern 
Europe in 14th century. Within Europe leadership shifted from Italian 
city states to the Iberian Peninsula, then in the 17th to North Western 
Europe, more specifically to the Dutch Republic. In the 18th century the, 
UK became the leader with breakthroughs in industrial production 
technologies. Around 1890, leadership shifted to the USA, which 
pioneered standardised production for mass markets and which has 
retained its lead in the post-1950 period. 
The productivity acceleration in the USA in the 1990s indicates 
that the USA shows no signs of losing its leadership in the short term. 
However, the Iraq war has shown the limits of US military dominance 
and persistent current account deficits and a declining confidence in 
the dollar may be the first signs of faltering leadership. Also, the twenty-
first century is witnessing the emergence of the Asian Giants China and 
India, whose weight in the world economic order is rapidly increasing. 
The long-run shifts in leadership imply that in historical perspective 
there are no insurmountable gaps between leaders and followers and 
that world hierarchies are far from immutable. 
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Fluidity: Catch up and relative stagnation 
Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century accelerated catch 
up processes took place in Germany, Russia (Gerschenkron, 1962) and 
Japan from 1868 onwards. Western European countries were catching 
up relative to the USA between 1950 and 1973. Japan’s catch up streak 
continued till 1990, followed by a long spell of sluggish growth and 
relative stagnation. Latin America grew rapidly from 1900 till 1980 
(Hoffman, 1998; Maddison, 2001), catching up in some subperiods, 
though not all. After 1982, the shock of the debt crisis threw growth off-
track in Latin America and triggered the lost decade of the 1980s and the 
subsequent economic instability. 
In Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong provided 
spectacular examples of catch up from 1950 onwards. Since the 1980s, 
second-tier NICs such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand have 
joined the race, while growth of output and productivity accelerated in 
the 1990s in China, India and Vietnam. 
As previously noted, since 1990, the catch-up process of Japan slowed 
down as Japan drew closer to the world frontier and had to make a 
painful shift from imitation to innovation.4  Productivity growth in 
the European economies and Japan lagged behind the accelerating 
productivity growth of the USA. Latin America experienced relative 
stagnation since 1980, both relative to the world leaders and relative 
to emerging Asia. The countries of the former Soviet Union have 
experienced large contractions of their economies after 1989. Recovery 
has since set in in some of these countries including the Russian 
Federation, but not all of them. One of the most dramatic examples 
of long-run comparative decline was Argentina where the sustained 
populist policies of Peron destroyed the economic promise of the forties. 
The resurgence of populist policies in Latin Africa bodes ill for the 
economic future of the continent.
Sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing stagnation since the 
oil crisis of 1973, but growth rates in several African countries have 
increased after 2000, fuelled by increasing demand for primary products. 
Some African countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Angola are now experiencing rapid growth. 
4  Fagerberg and Godinho (2006) argue that catch up involves more than merely imitating. It 
can also involve developing radical new ways of organization production and distribution. 
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The paradox of increasing global inequality and accelerated catch up
The technology race has resulted in a dramatic increase in long-run 
inequality in per capita incomes between countries. Around 1820, 
Maddison estimates that rich countries such as the UK had a per capita 
income of twice that of India. In 2006, the richest 29 countries are 14.2 
times as rich as the 48 poorest countries (at purchasing power parities) 
(WDI Database, 2008). In 2006, the ratio of the richest country in PPP 
terms, the USA to the poorest country, Burundi, was over 60 to 1.5 
The increase in global inequality demonstrates that is possible for 
some countries to experience sustained growth, escaping the shared 
poverty, characteristic of pre-modern agricultural economies. The 
concept of development itself is inextricably entwined with the long-
run increase in global inequality between countries. If some Western 
countries had not forged ahead since the fourteenth century, the very 
notion of development as a long-run improvement in economic and 
social conditions would have been inconceivable. Catch up experiences 
show that development is also possible for countries that start at the 
bottom rungs of the global income and productivity ladder.
Paradoxically, as the steps on the global income ladder move further 
apart, the speed with which countries change their positions in the 
income ranking is also rapidly accelerating. Changes in the position 
of countries in the international technology race are not new. But, the 
high growth rates of China and earlier Japan, Taiwan and Korea in the 
twentieth century have not yet been witnessed in economic history. 
In one or two generations, such countries move from the very lowest 
positions to the middle or even the upper ranges of the income ladder.
Thus, the experiences since 1950 indicate that increasing global 
inequality does not result in an insurmountable divide between rich 
and poor countries. Rather, the global income distribution becomes 
increasingly fluid.6 The boundaries between richer and poorer countries 
are continuously shifting. Formerly rich countries such as Argentine or 
the Russian Federation show relative decline. Formerly poor countries 
such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Taiwan and Korea move upwards. It is 
5  The exact ratio depends on how one defines the set of poorest and richest countries. It also 
depends on whether or not one has a balanced panel with the same countries defined as 
poor and rich at the beginning and the end of the period. Nevertheless, the long-run trends 
of increasing inequality are unmistakable.
6  An interesting characteristic of the international order after 1973 is that growth trends in 
the developing world have become divergent, with catch up in some regions and relative 
and absolute stagnation in others. This is a clear contrast with the period 1950-73.
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worth emphasizing that many of the catch-up countries are countries 
with large populations (India, China, Indonesia or Vietnam).7
The Asian miracle is not a miracle
Most of the catch up since 1950 took place in Asia. The literature 
abounds with references to the Asian Miracle or the Chinese Miracle. 
This is a misnomer. Very high growth rates are the normal pattern in 
a catch up process, where technological backward countries can profit 
from international available technological knowledge without bearing 
the costs and risks of developing new knowledge. If catch up takes place, 
it is usually happens very rapidly. If not, then a country will continue to 
fall behind. Table 2 provides evidence of the high rates of growth which 
are characteristic of catch up economies in the period since 1950.
7  This aspect of the international order is missed in the twin peak studies of Danny Quah 
(1997), which assign equal weight to all countries irrespective of their size and suggest 
insurmountable gaps between rich and poor countries.
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Table 2: Post-War Catch Up Episodes
Country Period Growth of GDP Growth of GDP/capita
China 1978-2006 8,1 6,9
West Germany 1950-1973 6,0 5,0
India 1994-2006 6,7 5,1
Indonesia 1967-1997 6,8 4,8
Ireland 1995-2006 6,2 6,2
Japan 1946-1973 9,3 8,0
Korea 1952-1997 8,2 6,3
Malaysia 1968-1997 7,5 5,1
Russia 1998-2005 7,2 7,2
Singapore 1960-1973 10,0 7,6
Taiwan 1962-1973 11,4 8,7
Thailand 1973-1996 7,6 5,8
Vietnam 1992-2005 7,6 6,1
   
World  1950-1973 4,9 2,9
World  1973-1997 3,1 1,4
World  1997-2003 3,5 2,3
Sources: Country data 1990 and before, plus figures for world total from Angus Maddison, Historical 
Statistics, World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2003 AD (Last update: August 2007)
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/
Country data 1991-2006 and West Germany from: 
The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, Novem-
ber 2007, http://www.conference-board.org/economics" .West Germany from Conference Board/GGDC
Note: The periods have been chosen so as to maximise sustained high growth rates over an extended 
period
Proximate, Intermediate and Ultimate Sources of Growth 
The framework
For the analysis of success and failure in long-run economic development, 
the framework of proximate and ultimate sources of growth developed 
by among others Angus Maddison (1988) is very useful.8 
The proximate sources of growth suggest ways in which countries 
can try to improve their position in the international technology 
and productivity race. The proximate sources refer to the directly 
measurable sources of growth of output such as capital accumulation, 
embodied technological change, growth of labour input and human 
8  Recently, a somewhat similar framework has also been put forward by Rodrik (2003), 
though without reference to the earlier work in this field.
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capital, exploitation of natural resources and the increasing efficiency 
with which resources are used to produce a flow of goods and services. 
In terms of growth of output per capita, the growth equation can be 
expressed in terms of capital intensity, human capital intensity, resource 
intensity and total factor productivity. 
It is long known (Abramovitz, 1989; Nelson, 1996; Rodrik, 2003) that 
one should be very careful in giving the sources of growth equation a 
strong structural interpretation. As Rodrik notes for instance, capital 
accumulation and efficiency of the use of resources are themselves 
endogenous. “.... observing that 80 per cent of growth is "accounted” for 
by accumulation does not tell us that growth would have necessarily 
been 80 per cent as high in the absence of technological change; perhaps 
in the absence of productivity change, the incentive to accumulate 
would have been much lower and the resulting capital deepening 
significantly less….. the causality may well run backwards, from growth 
to accumulation and productivity….”(Rodrik, 2003, p. 4). So we should 
think of accumulation and productivity as proximate determinants of 
growth at best. Nevertheless, the sources of growth equation sets the 
stage for what we want to explain and analyse.
Proximate sources of growth include the following
• Saving and Capital accumulation. Being sober and abstaining from 
current consumption in order to save and invest results in capital 
accumulation. Output per person engaged is increased by supplying 
workers with implements, machines and capital goods. The amount 
of capital per worker - capital intensity - increases. Not only does the 
amount of capital increase, but also its quality. Capital accumulation 
goes hand in had with capital embodied technological change. Capital 
accumulation can be more easily realised in spatially concentrated 
manufacturing than in spatially dispersed agriculture. This is one of the 
reasons why the emergence of manufacturing has been so important in 
growth and development. 
• Increased scale of production. Large-scale production of standardised 
products is usually more productive than small-scale production. As 
in the case of capital accumulation, scale economies are more easily 
realised in manufacturing than in agriculture. Recently, in the context 
of more flexible production systems, economies of scope have received 
more emphasis. But, economies of scope also assume production on a 
very large scale for very large markets.
• Increased effort. Output per person is increased by increasing the 
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labour input per person. This can take a variety of forms, including 
higher labour market participation and longer hours worked. Also 
of importance is the discipline and intensity of effort of members of 
the work force. This is why is how investments in health can affect 
the quality and intensity of labour input. Health status influences the 
physical and mental energy available for various kinds of work. Intensity 
of effort also links up with culturally defined attitudes, incentives and 
motivations with regard to work.
• Accumulation of human capital. Human capital theory suggests that 
schooling and education makes workers more productive. Accumulation 
of human capital may take place through formal schooling, but also 
through on-the-job training, learning by doing and by using new 
technologies. If the education system is adequate it transfers the latest 
state of knowledge to its students. This means that accumulation of 
human capital represents labour embodied technological change. 
• Exploration and exploitation of natural resources. This involves 
investment in land preparation for agricultural use and investment in 
the exploration and exploitation of energy resources and mineral raw 
materials. Exploitation of mineral resources can promote growth, but 
such growth will not be economically sustainable unless the revenues 
from windfall discoveries are transformed into more durable sources of 
growth in other sectors of the economy.
• Theft. Appropriating resources from other societies and using these 
to accumulate capital. Theft and colonial plunder can be an important 
source of capital accumulation. However, if resources are appropriated 
but not reinvested, they will have the same non-sustainable effects 
as windfall discoveries of natural resources. In the dominated society, 
the effect of appropriation is to reduce the investable surplus, thus 
contributing to economic stagnation.
• Increased efficiency. Efficiency subsumes a wide range of economic 
aspects such as economies of scale, capacity utilisation, effective use of 
existing technologies (technical efficiency), appropriate combinations 
of labour, capital and intermediate inputs (economic efficiency) and 
international specialisation according to comparative advantage. 
Structural change is also an important aspect of increased efficiency. 
Structural change involves shifting resources from sectors with lower 
productivity, lack of dynamism and weak linkages (such as traditional 
agriculture) to sectors with higher productivity, greater dynamism and 
stronger linkages (such as manufacturing). Specialisation and structural 
change result in a better allocation of resources across the economy. 
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• Changes in the organisation of production. This aspect of efficiency 
improvement (X-efficiency) deserves separate attention. It involves 
aspects such as the division of labour, flexible production systems, 
systems of motivation, monitoring systems and changes in the logistic 
organisation of production.
• Technological change proper (disembodied technological change). 
Disembodied technological change refers to advances in our technological 
knowledge concerning products and production processes. It involves 
the development of new production processes, new types of machinery, 
new forms of organisation, use of new inputs, new products and services, 
new ways of distributing products and services, and new knowledge 
that can be transferred through education. 
We can identify the following – partly overlapping - aspects of 
disembodied technological change: a. changes in a stock of knowledge 
available to the firm, the sector or the country; b. improvements in the 
knowledge absorbed by employees and managers in school and on the 
job through learning by doing. (Maddison, 1987, p. 662); c. improvements 
in technological capabilities of firms and social capabilities of countries 
d. the positive external effects of knowledge spillovers within an 
economy or between economies.
With regard to technological change we need to distinguish between 
technological change at the frontiers of knowledge in the lead economies 
and diffusion and absorption of technology in the follower countries.
• Complementarities of human skills and human capital and increases 
and improvements in the capital stock. Abramovitz has emphasized the 
importance of complementarities between the proximate sources of 
growth. Among the most important of these complementarities is that 
between capital goods embodying new technologies and improvements 
in skills and human capital. Without appropriate inflows of new capital, 
new skills will be wasted (Pack and Paxson, 2001) and vice versa. Thus, 
the joint effect of accumulation of human capital, and physical capital 
may be much larger than the sum of the separate contributions.
What complicates the issue, however, is that complementarity does 
not necessarily mean simultaneity. There are indications that prior 
investments in human capital set the stage for subsequent effective 
deployment of physical capital (Godo and Hayami, 2002; Sandberg, 
1982). The time lags involved can be substantial, up to 40-60 years.
Intermediate sources of growth refer to trends in domestic and 
international demand and economic policies, social policies and 
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technology policies. The intermediate sources of growth are important 
for the understanding of path-dependent nature of processes of 
success and failure. Thus when world demand and domestic demand 
is growing and market shares are expanding, this will help mobilise the 
accumulation of human and physical capital, which results in further 
growth and competitiveness.
Interpreting socio-economic policy as an intermediate factor 
emphasizes that policy is in turn influenced and constrained by more 
ultimate factors such as interests and class relationships. This is 
increasingly being rediscovered in recent research in political economy 
(e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, Shleifer, 1993, 
Shleifer et al. 2004), which see policy itself as an endogenous variable, 
explained by more ultimate factors as the balance of power and 
interests within societies.
Note that even within the proximate sources, there is circularity, 
as total factor productivity growth and technological change provide 
incentives for human and physical capital accumulation. 
The ultimate sources of growth refer to historical trends and the 
geographic, social and political conditions within which the proximate 
and intermediate factors operate. The ultimate sources include: 
a). geographic location, climate and natural resources; b). demographic 
and epidemiological trends; c). the history of political centralisation 
and state formation; d). the dynamics of class relationships, political 
conflict; e). the evolution of values and attitudes which affect economic 
behaviour; f). the development of institutions such as private property, 
intellectual property rights, joint stock companies, banking institutions, 
institutions for conflict management and maintenance of law and 
order, institutions which align economic incentives with social costs 
and benefits; g). developments in the international order, such as the 
international trade regime; h). long-run developments in science and 
technology; i). the distance of a country to the technological frontier, 
which determines its catch up potential; j). absorptive capacity and the 
evolution of technological and social capabilities.
In a recent version of the framework of proximate and ultimate 
sources of growth, Dani Rodrik (2003) emphasizes three key factors: 
geography (resources and location), institutions and openness to 
trade. Of these three, he argues that geography is the most ultimate. It 
influences the proximate resource endowment of a country, as well as 
its opportunities for trade through its location. Openness to trade and 
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institutions are seen as more intermediate sources, with institutions 
and institutional quality providing the key to the explanation for 
development. 
The use of the term ultimate sources of growth is not meant to imply 
a linear model of causality. Causality is circular, with economic growth 
obviously affecting demographic and epidemiological transitions in well-
known ways. In the long run even cultural values and institutions are 
shaped and reshaped in the course of economic development (Harrison, 
1985; Harrison and Huntington, 2000)9. The difference between the 
more ultimate and more proximate sources of causality lies mainly in 
the ease of quantification and the longer the time span of the chains 
of causality. It also provides a research strategy, which starts with the 
measurable economic factors and then goes beyond that to broader 
social and historical determinants. It also provides a framework for 
multidisciplinary analysis of economic development.
Initiating Growth and Maintaining Growth
In the context of a discussion of policy reform, Rodrik (2006) has made 
an important distinction between initiating growth and maintaining 
growth. The factors that initiate growth may not be the same as those 
important for maintaining growth. In order to initiate growth, one needs 
to identify the binding constraints facing a specific country. These will 
differ from country to country, so that policies which are successful in 
one setting may completely backfire in another. There are no standard 
recipes for kick-starting growth. This explains why so many of the 
cross-country regressions with policy or institutional variables give 
inconclusive results.
Once growth is underway, the question is how to maintain it in the 
longer run. Here gradual institutional improvements, which may not have 
been a binding constraint for starting growth, become more important. 
One might say that growth buys time for deeper institutional reforms. 
In absence of such reforms, an economy for instance remains vulnerable 
to external shocks, which may put a country off an accelerating growth 
path and put it on a stagnating trajectory. Examples of such external 
shocks are major wars such as World War I and II, financial crises such as 
the Asian crisis of 1997 or the debt crisis of 1982. 
External shocks can also have positive economic effects, such as 
the cataclysmic communist revolution in China or land reform in post-
9  Ester Boserup has argued that even the seemingly ultimate factor of ‘natural’ environment 
has been shaped by the impact of human interventions in socio-economic development.
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conflict Korea and Taiwan. It can have deep negative effects such as the 
impact of the debt crisis of 1982 on Latin American development, or 
of the Asian crisis on Indonesian economic development. Sometimes 
the same shock has very different effects on different countries. Most 
Asian economies recovered quickly from the Asian crisis, but Indonesia 
needed 10 years to regain to its pre-crisis levels of GDP per capita. Shocks 
interact with the strength and effectiveness of domestic institutional 
arrangements. Strong shocks combined with weak institutions and 
policies may have disastrous effects and put an economy on a downward 
growth trajectory.
Of course, there can be no long-run success without success in 
initiating growth in the short run. But the explanations of long-
term growth and development are different from those of success in 
initiating growth. In this lecture, I focus on the long-run patterns of 
growth and development. 
Theories of growth
Classical theorists such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill focus 
on ultimate factors such as the emergence and functions of market 
institutions. Karl Marx emphasized the dynamics of market competition, 
technological change and class relationships in the capitalist system. Max 
Weber focused on importance of political centralisation and stability and 
the religious underpinnings of the work and savings ethic. Schumpeter 
wrote eloquently about the emergence of entrepreneurship as the 
source of creative destruction and economic growth and on different 
types of market competition and their impact on innovation. In his 
later work he worried about the social forces such as bureaucratisation 
of research which were undermining entrepreneurship. Dependency 
theorists explain the underdevelopment of developing countries 
through the institutional characteristics of an exploitative international 
economic order.
Post-war neo-classical growth theories focus much more 
on proximate factors such as education, capital accumulation or 
comparative advantage. Until recently, mainstream economic theories 
have tended to disregard ultimate factors such as the evolution 
of markets, institutions, class relations and technological change. 
These were dismissed as exogenous and are relegated to despised 
disciplines such as history, sociology or anthropology. Only recently have 
mainstream economists rediscovered institutions (e.g. Easterly, 2001; 
Rodrik, 2003; Acemoglu, 2005).
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Theories of growth are radically different in their predictions about 
the chances of catch up in developing countries. Neo-classical theories 
of growth predict convergence between rich and poor countries, as the 
returns to capital are higher in poor countries where capital is scarce. 
This prediction runs counter to the empirical evidence which suggests 
long-run divergence. Theories of conditional convergence present a 
modified version of the neo-classical argument, which suggests that 
within groups of countries with similar initial conditions levels of GDP 
per capita tend to converge. However, the steady-state growth rates 
of the different growth clubs may differ so that divergence between 
convergence clubs may or may not result in global divergence. The 
problem with this strand of theory is that it does not explain why 
different clubs of countries converge of diverge. Endogenous growth 
theory, a modern version of neo-classical theory predicts systematic 
divergence between leaders and followers, because firms in the lead 
economies benefit from technology spillovers resulting in constant 
or even increasing returns to investments in capital, education and 
technology. Thus rich countries will forge ahead and poor countries 
with less domestic spillovers will fall behind. A weakness of new growth 
theory is that it cannot easily cope with the evidence on catch up in 
selected developing countries.
Theories of the advantages of backwardness. Authors such as Veblen, 
Gerschenkron, Abramovitz and Maddison have argued forcefully that 
there are great potential advantages to technological backwardness. 
Technologically backward countries can profit from international 
technology transfers or spillovers, without bearing the costs and risks of 
investment in innovation at the knowledge frontier. If their absorptive 
capacities are sufficiently developed, they can experience explosive 
growth spurts through rapid incorporation and adaptation of modern 
international technology. 
Growth is explosive for a variety of reasons. First, there are sudden 
jumps in technological levels. There is an element of leapfrogging from 
vastly outdated technologies to state-of-the-art technologies, such as 
digital switching or mobile phone systems. Second, the capital-intensive 
nature of modern technology tends to make growth a scale intensive 
process, with an all-or-nothing character (Gerschenkron, 1982). If growth 
takes place in a technologically backward economy, it will tend to be 
more rapid than in previous historical growth episodes.
This theory is very relevant for our understanding of the post-war 
catch experiences in Asia. Also, Gerschenkron has alerted us to the 
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fact that the conditions and policies underlying growth spurts change 
over time, given the nature of technology and developments in the 
international order. This opens up growth theory to historical inquiry.
What remains problematic is how to explain why in a given setting 
the lead countries sometimes forge ahead leaving followers behind, 
such as the USA versus Europe and Japan in the nineties, while in 
other settings the lead countries are overtaken by the newcomers. 
We encountered a similar problem when discussing conditional 
convergence. A second question is why some countries profit from the 
advantages of backwardness in a given period, while other countries 
fail to do so and fall behind even further. But here, catch up theory does 
give some promising answers by pointing to the importance of the 
absorptive capacities of follower countries. 
Evolutionary theories of growth (in the tradition of Schumpeter and 
later Nelson and Winter, 1982; see also Dosi et al., 1988; Freeman and 
Soete, 1997, Verspagen, 1993; Verspagen, 2001; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 
2002). Evolutionary theory combines ideas about advantages of 
backwardness and technology gaps with notions similar to those of new 
growth theorists about spillovers in the lead economies.10 Evolutionary 
theory postulates a race between technological change and domestic 
spillovers in the lead countries resulting in divergence and international 
diffusion of technology to follower countries resulting in catch up. The 
balance between these two forces is not deterministically given. It 
depends on the size of the technology gap – when the gap is larger than 
some threshold level, the disadvantages of backwardness outweigh 
the potential advantages. It also depends on differences in absorptive 
capacities between developing countries (Verspagen, 1991). Finally, 
like theories of backwardness, evolutionary theory allows for changes 
in historical circumstances and the emergence of new technological 
‘paradigms’ (Freeman and Perez, 1988), which may reshuffle the 
technological playing field and create new opportunities for backward 
countries and new penalties of leadership for the lead countries. Thus 
acceleration of technical change in information technologies created 
new and previously unconceivable opportunities for catch up through 
10  Evolutionary theory rejects some of the key notions of new neoclassical growth theory 
such as equilibrium, common production functions and the representative actor. Rather it 
focuses on varieties of actors following different rules of thumb. The impact of a selection 
environment on success and failure of economic actors creates path dependent trajecto-
ries. Nevertheless, in there are similarities in the endogenisation of technological change 
(see Verspagen, 2001).
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growth in ICT services in countries such as India. It also created new 
opportunities for manufacturing outsourcing to developing countries, 
through global value chains, which have had profound impacts on the 
global division of labour. 
Importance of technological change in modern growth theories
Investment in technological change is central to present-day theories 
of growth and catch up of all stripes, whether new growth theory, 
theories of backwardness or evolutionary theories. In the deepest sense, 
growth and catch up has to do with the generation and diffusion of 
new knowledge and technology. Technological change is entwined with 
all other factors in the growth equation (capital, education, efficiency, 
disembodied technological change, structural change), but also plays an 
independent role as disembodied knowledge or technology. In his wide-
ranging analysis of the sources of economic growth, Abramovitz (1989) 
concluded that underlying the separate sources identified in growth 
analysis, is a common process of technological change, which manifests 
itself in a variety of ways. 
Knowledge is produced through human effort, and requires 
investment. But investment in new technology or new knowledge is 
fundamentally different from investment in physical capital. It is harder 
to exploit commercially than physical capital goods. The characteristic 
of knowledge is that it flows, diffuses and spills from firm to firm, 
individual to individual, country to country. Unless means can be devised 
to control the unrestricted flow of knowledge and appropriate part 
of the revenues accruing to new knowledge, there will be insufficient 
incentives for sustained and costly investment in new knowledge.11 Thus, 
restricting or controlling the free flow of technological knowledge is one 
of the profound sources of growth and development, as it provides an 
incentive for the production of new knowledge and technology. 
On the other hand the rapid diffusion of knowledge is just as important 
as a source of growth. Investment in knowledge has widespread positive 
external effects. Firms profit from the advances of knowledge produced 
by their competitors, and thus growth in knowledge producing countries 
will accelerate due to these spillovers. The better the absorptive capacities 
11  The importance of patents as a means of appropriation is contested (Nuvolari, 2004). There 
are those who argue that other methods of appropriation such as secrecy or first mover ad-
vantages are more important. Even more important is the notion of open source innovation 
where sharing common knowledge is the main incentive. It is an interesting debate, but I 
think the importance of these idealistic alternatives is overrated.
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of firms, the less restrictions there are to the spread of technology and 
the more efficient the national system of innovation (Lundvall, 1992), 
the more rapid growth will be. The countries that profit most from these 
spillovers will be the leaders in the technology race.
Diffusion of knowledge and knowledge spillovers are not only 
important within national economies, they also take place in an 
international context. It is the international diffusion of knowledge 
which has contributed to spectacular catch up in a limited number 
of developing countries since 1950, as emphasized by theories of 
backwardness. The more the free flow of knowledge is restricted through 
policy measures or institutional obstacles, the less opportunities there 
are for catch up based on the advantages of backwardness. Developing 
countries that acquire, steal, copy and absorb knowledge effectively will 
be the candidates for catch up.
Thus, diffusion of technological knowledge works in two opposite 
directions. On the one hand it is the main force making for global 
divergence in modern theories of growth. The lead countries tend to 
have the strongest systems of innovation. They will profit most from the 
advances in knowledge generated by their firms, R&D labs and inventors. 
On the other hand, international diffusion of knowledge explains very 
rapid catch up. In the international context of technological leaders and 
followers, the Gerschenkron/Abramovitz catch up effect can also be seen 
as a manifestation of international knowledge flows. The greater the 
gap between leaders and followers, the greater the potential for growth 
due to knowledge flows. This notion has become generally accepted in 
growth accounting and growth analysis, but it is not always explicitly 
linked to the newer concept of spillovers. In any event, a technology 
gap term is now standard in growth equations. It clearly refers to an 
important aspect of disembodied technological change. 
Though knowledge seems to flow easily, it is nevertheless very 
difficult to absorb. Some firms are able to absorb knowledge, others 
fail to do so. At a macro-level differences in absorptive capacities are 
important in explaining which developing countries embark on a catch 
up path and which countries fall behind. This is reflected a number of 
different literatures, which are not always cognisant of each other. These 
include the literatures on technological capabilities which focuses 
on absorptive capacities of firms in developing countries, the macro-
literature on social capabilities based on Abramovitz which focuses on 
the absorptive capacities of countries and the literature on systems of 
innovation pioneered by Lundvall (1992), which can be used to explain 
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flows of knowledge both within countries and between countries.
Patterns and Explanations
Let us now examine whether we can find common elements and 
patterns in successful episodes of economic development.
Proximate sources
• Capital accumulation
Without exception successful development involves bridging the capital 
intensity gap and increasing domestic savings and/or foreign inflows of 
capital. Without rapid accumulation of capital, there can be no success in 
economic development. Capital accumulation and capital intensification 
are closely linked with industrialisation.
Developing countries have been remarkably effective in increasing 
their investment rates since 1950. Saving rates in developing countries 
are now comparable to or higher than those in the advanced economies. 
China, in particular, has extremely high savings rates. But, neither the rate 
of capital accumulation nor the level of capital per worker is a guarantee 
for a high rate of economic growth. If the efficiency of investment is 
low and absorptive capacity (skills, education, capability, experience, 
incentives) is lacking, capital productivity and total factor productivity 
will be low and the impact of accumulation on growth will be limited. 
Thus, the very substantial increases in investment rates in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the post-war period are not mirrored by comparable increases 
in the rates of economic growth. 
• Net inflow of resources and accumulation
In contrast to the pre-war period in which many colonies experienced a 
net outflow of resources, the post-war period is characterised by a net 
inflow of financial resources to developing countries (Maddison, 1986; 
Szirmai, 2005). This inflow consists of loans, foreign direct investment, 
private transfers, aid flows and debt relief. The inflows were briefly 
interrupted in the late 1980s in the aftermath of the debt crisis of 
1982 and in the late 1990s after the Asian crisis. But, after a few years 
the pattern of inflows reasserted itself. Developing countries have 
typically imported more than they exported. They have imported both 
capital goods and consumer goods. On balance, the inflows of capital 
have contributed to higher savings rates and higher rates of capital 
accumulation. 
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• Human capital accumulation
In all cases of successful development, investment in human capital, 
expansion of educational enrolment and increased literacy have been 
important, in one way or another. The argument of Gerschenkron (1962) 
that education can be replaced by technologies which economise on 
skilled labour is not supported by the historical record of catch up 
countries. 
The expansion of education and human capital has been one of the 
greatest success stories of the post-war period (see Szirmai, 2005, tables 
7.1-7.6). In many cases starting from scratch, developing countries have 
built comprehensive education systems which cover large segments of 
their populations. Though there are major problems with educational 
quality and the mismatch between education and the labour market 
and though universal primary education has not yet been realised in 
all countries, progress in human capital accumulation is unmistakable. 
Rates of illiteracy are decreasing and human capital per worker is 
increasing.
The effects of education on economic development are, however, 
very complex. Some theorists have emphasized that expansion of 
education and literacy precedes acceleration of economic development 
by many decades. This was the case in the Scandinavian countries, 
Japan, China, Taiwan and Korea (Sandberg, 1982; Nuñez, 1990; Godo and 
Hayami, 2002). So, expansion of education may not have immediate 
and direct consequences for growth, as is confirmed by the experiences 
of many developing countries. In an excellent analysis of the Japanese 
catch-up experience, Godo and Hayami (2002) combine the notions 
of complementarity and threshold. The early increase in education 
initially had little impact on growth, because capital per worker was 
growing slowly, so there was little complementarity. After World War II, a 
threshold level of education had been reached and capital accumulation 
and slower education advance combined to promote explosive growth. 
Where educational investment was insufficient, this has generally 
acted as a brake on development. Thus, expansion and improvement 
of education in one form or another may be considered one of the 
important necessary conditions for development.
 The concept of human capital is broader than the level of education. 
It includes health and sufficient nutrition, which also contribute to 
productivity of households and growth of economies.
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• Structural change: Industrialisation as an engine of growth
Since 1950, all developing countries that have experienced rapid growth 
and catch up, have been successful industrialisers and industrial 
exporters (e.g. van Ark and Timmer, 2003). Countries that fell behind 
in aggregate terms were also the weakest industrial performers. In the 
past fifty years, manufacturing has been the main engine of growth 
and development in developing countries. In other words, the structural 
change involved in the shift from agriculture to industry has been a key 
ingredient of successful economic development.
The pattern of structural change in post-war developing countries 
differed from the earlier pattern in the advanced economies, where the 
share of industry increased first and the share of services increased later. 
In developing countries, there was a simultaneous shift from agriculture 
to industry and services. At an early stage, the share of services was 
already as high as or higher than that of industry. This has to do with 
the rapid expansion of the government share in GDP. It is likely that this 
early growth of a not very productive service sector acted as a brake on 
development. 
Though the share of manufacturing in GDP and employment has 
increased in a great majority of developing countries, the increasing 
share of developing countries in world exports of manufacturing 
goods attributable to some 12-15 countries (including China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, 
Singapore and Hong Kong). 
• The learning curve for industrialisation
According to Arthur Lewis learning to industrialise is a lengthy process 
which can take up to 30- 40 years (Lewis, 1978). Both the evolution of 
industrial entrepreneurship and the submission to the discipline of 
factory production for a work force being transferred from agriculture 
are difficult processes which take considerable time. It is worth noting 
that all the developing countries which were successful in industrialising 
after 1950, had learning experiences in industrialisation which date back 
to the 1930s and sometimes even to the nineteenth century, as in the 
case of China and India. The failed industrialisation of sub-Saharan Africa 
since 1950 is not due to some innate incapacity for industrial production. 
It is in part due to the fact that industrialisation really started from 
almost nothing in the post-war period. This means that future prospects 
for industrialisation in African countries may be brighter than before. 
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• Agricultural development: Decreasing shares, increasing output and 
productivity
In contrast to the predictions of Malthusian pessimists, developing 
countries have been remarkably successful in increasing the per capita 
output of foodstuffs in the post-war period. The increases have been 
most striking in large and densely populated developing countries such 
as India, Indonesia and China (Szirmai, 2005, table 10.1). The exception to 
this trend is sub-Saharan Africa where output per capita is at the same 
level as that in 1979-81 and lower than in 1934.
These output and productivity increases have been realised through 
expansion of arable land, increases in cropping intensities, increases in 
irrigation, increases in the application of fertilizers and development 
and diffusion of new seeds (biotechnological change). Increases in yields 
per harvest (irrigation, fertilizers and technological change) account for 
over 70 per cent of output growth in the past 40 years (Szirmai, 2005, 
table 10.8). 
These increases in agricultural output have been realised with 
shrinking shares of agricultural in total employment and shrinking 
shares of agriculture in GDP. Nevertheless, there is a correlation 
between successful development in agriculture and overall economic 
performance in developing countries.
• Total factor productivity growth and technological change
In the context of East Asian industrialisation, there is a well-known 
debate between accumulationists emphasizing the role of capital 
accumulation and assimilationists emphasizing the role of technological 
change (see Timmer, 2000). Accumulationists argue that physical capital 
accumulation has been more important than total factor productivity 
growth. Their rather pessimistic prediction that the growth process will 
run out of steam once sufficient capital has been accumulated, has so 
far not materialised in South and East Asia.
There is, however, a measure of truth in the accumulationist 
observation that in early phases of industrial development, wasteful 
processes of accumulation predominate, whether in Stalinist Russia, 
Maoist China, Nehru’s India or Nyerere’s Tanzania. Industrialisation in 
Korea and Taiwan also started with capital accumulation in combination 
with cheap unskilled labour in textiles and assembly activities. This 
‘primitive’ accumulation usually goes hand in hand with highly distorted 
markets, extensive government intervention, protection and large scale 
of production (Lin et al., 2000). These phases have been associated 
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with import substitution policies discussed below under intermediate 
factors.
The key question is whether, after accumulation processes have been 
set into motion, an economy can upgrade its production technology, 
achieve shifts from low-tech sectors to medium and high tech sectors, and 
increase overall efficiency. All these processes will express themselves in 
total factor productivity growth. One of the typical differences between 
success and failure in economic development lies in the realisation of 
this switch from accumulation to upgrading.
The development experiences of both the newer and the older Asian 
industrialising countries demonstrate that the accumulationists have 
been too pessimistic. On average, TFP growth rates since the 1990s 
have been higher than in the 1970s and 1980s. Growth has accelerated, 
human capital has been upgraded, new sectors have emerged and new 
technologies have been absorbed. The assimilationists are also right in 
emphasizing that even the raw accumulation of physical capital requires 
a major effort of mastering, adapting and implementing imported 
embodied technologies. Thus, TFP change in developing countries is 
closely associated with the international transfer and acquisition of 
technology. 
Intermediate sources
• Prudent macroeconomic policies
It is now becoming customary in academic circles to routinely sneer at 
the Washington consensus (Williamson, 1990) underlying the neoliberal 
policies in developing countries since the 1990s. However, there is 
strong evidence that macroeconomic stability and prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies have been essential ingredients in the Asian growth 
performance and successful growth episodes elsewhere.
It is the inability of Latin American countries to implement sustained 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies over longer periods of time, 
which underpins the disappointing performance of Latin American 
policies since the oil shock of 1973. In Latin America, bursts of painful 
macroeconomic restructuring adjustment have been followed time and 
time again by populist waves of resistance against adjustment policies. 
Thus, it seems as if Latin America is primarily experiencing the negative 
side of economic orthodoxy: painful restructuring without long-term 
benefits following from sustained adjustment policies. This inability 
to realise sustained macroeconomic stability may well have to do with 
high degrees of initial inequality in Latin America which creates political 
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stresses and pressures that affect the economic policy stance.12 The 
present re-emergence of Peronist-type policies and populist political 
movements in Venezuela and Bolivia bodes ill for their economic future 
in the longer run.
However, orthodox macroeconomic policies are in themselves not 
sufficient to attain high growth rates and increased economic welfare. 
These also requires micro-economic changes and supporting industrial 
and technology policies which allow for a transition from capital 
accumulation to technological upgrading. 
• Policies aimed at achieving a balance between agricultural and industrial 
development 
Balanced growth path theory emphasizes that growth is enhanced 
if the different sectors grow at such rates that they do not act as a 
brake on growth in other sectors. This is especially relevant for the 
agricultural sector. As the agricultural sector provides food to the 
urban population, intermediate inputs to manufacturing and a market 
for industrial products, policy discrimination against agriculture has 
a negative impact on industrial growth and development success. 
Between 1945 and 1960, development policies discriminated heavily 
against agriculture, with markedly negative results. Countries in sub-
Saharan Africa which had long been self-sufficient in food production, 
became more and more dependent on agricultural imports and food 
aid. Negative climatic conditions and droughts account for some of this 
impact, but man-made policies were at least as important in explaining 
agricultural stagnation.
In parts of the developing world, intersectoral policies started 
changing from 1960 onwards. Especially, India, China, Vietnam, Thailand 
and Indonesia started taking a more balanced approach (Timmer, 
2005). The policy bias against agriculture continued longest in sub-
Saharan Africa, up till around 1980 or later. It is only since the 1990s 
that changes have started being implemented here in the context of 
structural adjustment programmes. These changes refer to the gradual 
elimination of price controls, marketing boards and similar exploitative 
institutions that discriminate against agriculture. 
• Trade regime : Outward economic orientation
The developing countries which are economically most successful are 
12  This is an example of the intermediate character of economic policy, which in turn is influ-
enced by more ultimate conditions in a country.
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invariably those that opened up to the outside world and engaged 
in international trade. (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995; Rodrik, 2003). 
Those countries that remained inward-oriented for too long, were the 
countries that stagnated. The degree of export-orientedness is one of 
the key elements distinguishing Southeast Asia from Latin America. 
Latin America continued inward-looking policies much longer than 
the East Asian economies. The outward orientation of the East Asian 
economies contributed to an appropriate choice of techniques, where 
economies made optimal use of their supply of cheap labour to become 
competitive on world markets.
• Openness to foreign investment
Openness also refers to the role of Foreign Direct Investment in the 
economy. Though Japan and South Korea are famous examples of 
countries that were able to acquire international technology, without 
opening up in any important ways to foreign investment, this route is 
no longer open to most developing countries (Westphal, 2002). Since 
the 1970s, FDI is one of the key channels of technology acquisition. It 
has played a very positive role in countries with sufficiently developed 
absorptive capacities. The volume and impact of FDI have increased 
tremendously. The more developed its absorptive capacities, the more a 
country will profit from FDI. The less developed the absorptive capacity 
of a country, the more exploitative will the role of foreign capital be.
• Trade regime: Reducing protectionism
The evidence that trade openness is positively linked to economic 
success is mixed. Some studies see a connection between openness 
and growth, other (e.g. Fagerberg and Srholec, 2006) question the direct 
correlation between indicators of openness and growth. This finding 
is not so surprising and reflects the historical poverty of cross-country 
regression methods. 
Why is the evidence so mixed? First, in almost all cases of economic 
success, outward orientation was preceded by a period of closure, 
protectionism and import substitution. The only exceptions that come to 
mind are the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore, which were simply 
too small to depend on their domestic markets. For most successful 
developing countries, import substitution did provide the time required 
for learning the basics of industrialisation. There are few examples of 
developing countries which started exporting manufactured goods from 
scratch.
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Examples of formerly inward-looking economies which turned 
outwards include South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, India, China and 
Indonesia. In this respect, the much maligned import substitution 
has played a positive role in the economic history of the presently 
economically more successful developing countries. The present 
emphasis in the world trade negotiations on unconditional trade 
liberalisation by the poorest developing countries may disregard the 
positive role that protection has played in the past (Chang, 2002).
In the second place, the outward orientation of the successful East 
Asian economies has not been synonymous with import liberalisation 
and reduced levels of industrial protection. In spite of the smoke screens 
thrown up in the ambiguous World Bank study, The East Asian Miracle 
(1993), policy interventions and import protection continued to play and 
important role in most of the successful Asian economies (except in 
laissez-fair Hong Kong).
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that protectionist policies 
tend to nurture inefficiency, waste and economic stagnation, by reducing 
incentives for competition. This occurred in both in Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa. In China, the protected state enterprises continue 
to be a burden on the overall economy. The sooner economies exposed 
their firms to the discipline of the market, the more they profited from 
the learning effects of the preceding period of import substitution. The 
later the turn outwards, the more the inefficiency generating effects of 
protection predominated. The acceleration of growth in China and India 
was unmistakably accompanied by a shift towards a more-outward 
looking stance in trade policy, reduced protection and an increase 
in competitive pressures. Economic stagnation in Africa and Latin 
America is associated with continued protection which was conducive 
to inefficiency and rent seeking behaviour.
• Financial openness
Not all forms of openness are beneficial for growth and development. 
Since the financial crises of the 1990s, in particular the Asian crisis of 
1997, a convincing case has been made for retaining some measure of 
control over short term capital flows, to avoid extreme destabilisation 
in globalised financial markets (Stiglitz, 2000, 2002; Tobin, Eichengreen, 
2000). Premature financial openness makes developing countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets and shaky banking systems more 
vulnerable to external shocks.
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• International trade policies
In the longer run, international trade policy and reduced restrictions 
on international trade achieved in successive GATT negotiation rounds 
have had positive effects on industrialisation and growth in developing 
countries and have contributed in major ways to their increased access 
to developed country markets. The great exception has been agricultural 
protection, which has continued almost unabated to the present day to 
the detriment of the primary export prospects of developing countries, 
whether of the poorest LDCs in Africa or the more affluent Latin 
American countries.
• Liberalisation, deregulation and market orientation
Acceleration of growth in Asia has unmistakably been accompanied by 
economic liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and the turn towards 
markets in the vast economies of China, India and Indonesia. In Africa, 
liberalisation initially led to further economic decline, deindustrialisation 
and stagnation as non-competitive parastatals were exposed to 
international competition. In Latin America, the record of liberalisation 
has been mixed, primarily because liberalisation of trade, finance 
and domestic markets led to increased macroeconomic instability in 
countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.
State-led growth was able to achieve substantial rates of capital 
accumulation in the post-war period in Brazil, Mexico, India and China, 
Soviet Russia, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya. But it failed to deliver 
sustained growth, as planned economies were too inflexible and rigid 
to respond to increasingly rapid changes in domestic and international 
demand, in technology and in the global division of labour. State-led 
policies may be appropriate for rapid capital accumulation in the initial 
stages of industrial development but not for total factor productivity 
growth and technological upgrading. For sub-Saharan Africa, one can 
conclude without any hesitation that state intervention, nationalisations 
and forced industrialisation policies stifled growth after promising 
beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s.
• Industrial and technology policies
The Asian Miracle (1993) attempted to reinterpret the Southeast Asian 
economic success as the result of outward orientation and market-
friendly policies. But the conclusions of the study contradicted many 
of the interesting chapters included in the book, which gave ample 
evidence of the heavily interventionist nature of economic policies in 
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most of these economies. This has since been confirmed in a whole 
range of studies which definitively confirm the interventionist nature 
of East Asian economic policy (Westphal 2002; Amsden 1989; Wade 
1990). Economic policy was not simply directed at import liberalisation 
and market liberalisation. On the contrary, high rates of protection were 
maintained and key sectors, conglomerates and even enterprises were 
supported and subsidised. 
Science, technology and educational policy acted as a supplement to 
economic policy. Industrial policy was oriented towards upgrading and 
the shift from traditional low-tech sectors such as textiles to high-tech 
sectors such as electronics. Technology policy was directed at improving 
domestic research capacity, improving human capital and acquiring 
international technology. Technology policy and industrial policy 
interacted to promote learning, acquisition of technological capabilities 
and absorptive capacity. Thus the choice to invest in a given sector 
such as electronics in Malaysia was not only determined by immediate 
economic prospects, but also by long-run learning prospects. 
In Kicking Away the Ladder, Chang (2002), argues that in the present-
day orthodox liberal world economic order, the developing countries in 
Africa and Latin America that are seeking to emulate the experiences 
of the Asian countries, are deprived of the tools and instruments which 
contributed to success in the past, such as some degree of protection and 
interventionist technology and industrial policies. Chang’s conclusions 
are logical and derive from a realistic interpretation of policies in Asia. 
Nevertheless, his policy advice is not without risk for Latin America and 
even more so for sub-Saharan African countries. 
In sub-Saharan Africa it is clear that state policies themselves have 
been among the main sources of economic stagnation. In this context, 
one should be wary of anything that increases the discretionary power 
of the state apparatus. State policies have contributed to the destruction 
of agriculture in countries that had food surpluses at the eve of 
their independence. State policies have led to forced industrialisation 
strategies that have been a failure across the board and resulted in 
industries with a negative contribution to GDP at world prices. State 
policies have squandered natural resources and riches in a wide range 
of countries. Thirty years of industrial protection has not resulted in 
sufficient learning experiences. On the contrary, it has created deeply 
inefficient parastatal enterprises which were unable to compete in 
a liberalised setting and which melted down when protection was 
abolished (For Tanzania see Van Engelen et al., 2001). 
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Given the institutional quality of the state apparatus in Africa, it 
is likely that the present trend towards liberalisation and withdrawal 
of the state from the economy may be the best of bad options. There 
are some indications that after 10 years of deindustrialization in East 
Africa, some countries such are starting to experience some recovery. 
These include countries such as Zambia, Tanzania or Mozambique 
which are starting to profit from inflows of foreign direct investment 
and accelerated growth since 2000 (e.g. Portelli, 2006). At a later stage, 
if and when the quality of governance and government institutions has 
also improved in Africa, one might revisit the debate reopened by Chang. 
But, not at this moment.
My conclusion is that the debate concerning industrial and technology 
policy and the use of instruments of protection cannot be separated 
from the debate about the quality of government institutions. The 
more effective government institutions, the more scope there is for 
policy interventions. It is also relevant for the policy debate that the 
acceleration of growth in China, India and Indonesia in the nineties 
was associated on balance with a marked trend towards deregulation, 
privatisations and a strengthening of market forces. 
• Aid policies and debt relief
Aid is not a major determinant of successful economic growth and 
development. Never in economic history have inflows of aid been 
responsible for a country’s turnaround from stagnation to growth and 
catch up. Ultimately, growth and socio-economic development can 
only be realised through internal efforts, entrepreneurship, policies and 
internal dynamics. At best, the positive effects of aid on growth and 
development are marginal.
In the absence of endogenous growth dynamics, the impact of aid on 
poverty reduction is limited. Rapid reductions of the number of people 
below absolute poverty lines can only be achieved in the context of rapid 
growth of per capita incomes, as in present day China, India, Vietnam or 
in Indonesia under the Suharto regime.
Nevertheless, aid flows can supplement domestic savings 
and commercial financial flows. In a favourable context, they can 
contribute to the alleviation of bottlenecks in development. Thus 
aid flows have contributed to breakthroughs in agricultural research 
and to the diffusion of new agricultural technologies. They have also 
contributed in important ways to expansion of educational systems 
in developing countries, which are important investment in human 
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capital accumulation. Well-targeted aid flows can also contribute to the 
realisation of limited but important developmental goals, such as the 
eradication of river blindness, tuberculosis, treatment and prevention of 
aids or malaria, improving sanitation and water supply or the diffusion 
of contraceptive techniques and birth control methods. But of course in 
the long run, a developing country will only be able to finance its own 
health and social service infrastructure if it improves its productive 
capabilities. In the absence of this, the country eternally continue to be 
dependent on aid flows.
In the worst case, aid flows allow governments to continue ineffective 
and economically counterproductive agricultural and industrial policies, 
which they would not have been able to sustain in the absence of aid 
flows.
Aid becomes counterproductive when aid flows are too large as a 
percentage of GDP. There is a potential negative effect of very large 
inflows of aid, which have a distorting influence on entrepreneurial 
incentives. Latent resources of innovativeness and entrepreneurial spirit 
increasingly become diverted from productive investment towards 
gaining access to aid resources, subsidies and aid projects. There is no 
hard empirical evidence for the threshold level beyond which aid flows 
start having a negative impact on the long-run prospects of growth and 
dynamism. Hermes and Lensink (2002) argue for an unrealistically high 
50 percent threshold beyond which the marginal returns to aid decline. 
My working hypothesis – so far empirically untested and not more than 
a hunch - is that a sustained inflow of aid beyond a threshold level of 
around 10 percent of GDP will seriously sap the long-run productive 
potential of a country.
From this perspective, one cannot but be deeply sceptical about 
the realisation of the millennium development goals and critical 
of the hype surrounding them. After his enthusiastic contribution 
to big bang theories of rapid transition to the market which have 
contributed to economic disaster in the Russian Federation, Jeffrey Sachs, 
the auctor intellectualis of the Millennium Goals, now wants to save the 
world, preferably within ten years. Lessons from past experiences with big 
push strategies are being disregarded (Easterly, 2006). This will almost 
inevitably lead to new disappointments. For instance, the proposed 
doubling of aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa will not lead to more rapid 
growth in the absence of improved absorptive capacities. Therefore, it 
will also not lead to poverty reduction. This is irrespective of the number 
of poverty reduction strategy papers desperate government officials in 
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African countries are forced to draft by international agencies. 
An possible exception to this negative scenario might be when aid 
takes the form of large-scale debt relief. Some of the poorest countries 
have borrowed themselves into situations where debt overhang acts 
as a disincentive to any kind of economic effort. Reckless lending by 
international financial institutions and private banks has contributed 
to this situation. Therefore, at least part of the responsibility for 
indebtedness lies with these institutions. Past attempts at debt 
restructuring were often no more than attempts to bail out the global 
system of financial institutions, by refinancing developing country debt, 
while maintaining their indebtedness. Large-scale debt relief for the 
poorest countries could clear the deck for a fresh start. There is some 
evidence that some of the poorest countries are now benefiting from 
the HIPC initiative. Financial flows associated with debt relief do not 
have the distorting effects on entrepreneurial effort discussed above. 
Debt relief does presume prior changes in the nature and transparency 
of policy making. If these changes are not forthcoming, debt relief will 
simply reward ineffective policies and allow for their continuation by 
the same elites that were responsible for the failures of the past. It 
discriminates against countries, which have followed more prudent 
borrowing policies.
Ultimate sources
In the light of our rejection of mono-causal explanations, generalising 
about the ultimate sources of growth is perhaps the hardest of all. Here 
I discuss a number of the key factors from the literature.
• Scientific and technological advance 
Long-run changes in science and technology are among the ultimate 
sources of increases in productive capacity. The locus of such change 
is in the most advanced economies of the world economic order. From 
there, technological change spreads and diffuses to those developing 
countries that have sufficient absorptive capacity to profit from global 
technological change. But scientific and technological advance itself 
depends on the institutional and cultural incentives for intellectual and 
inventive effort and the resources invested in the progress of knowledge. 
It is thus entangled with other ultimate factors.
The rate of scientific and technological change is accelerating. From 
the perspective of developing countries this is a double-edged sword. 
For some countries technological change creates new opportunities for 
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catch up and even leapfrogging. Thus, rapid advances in communication 
and information technology in the post-war period allow for the 
emergence of global production chains and the rapid outsourcing of 
large parts of manufacturing production to developing countries. On 
balance, this has had tremendous advantages for developing countries. 
In the service sector, technological change creates unexpected new 
opportunities for developing countries, such as the outsourcing of call 
centres, administrative work and soft-ware programming which were 
not available in earlier periods. Rapid advances in biotechnology create 
opportunities for breakthroughs in agricultural production and health 
care of which some countries have availed themselves.
But the acceleration of technological change creates increasing 
problems for those countries which are falling behind and do not have 
the absorptive capacity to tap into global change. Such countries are in 
danger of becoming even more marginalised and stagnant than they 
already were. These issues will be taken up again in the final section of 
this paper.
• Initial conditions: Prior productivity increases in agriculture
Prior productivity increases in agriculture are among the conditions 
facilitating the emergence of industry in a developing country. 
Productivity increases in agriculture create a surplus available for 
investment (Timmer, 1988). Productivity increase in agriculture releases 
resources for industrialisation in the early stages of industrialisation, 
without endangering domestic food production. Countries illustrating 
this phenomenon include post-war Korea and Taiwan, Japan in the 
late nineteenth century, Britain in the eighteenth century, China after 
1978. African agriculture is a negative case in point. Low productivity 
in traditional agriculture provided an inauspicious starting point for 
the African industrialisation drive in the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
• Initial conditions: Historically determined initial levels of economic and 
social inequality 
In the post-war period, lower initial levels of economic inequality 
of income and land ownership create a more favourable setting for 
growth. Extreme inequality constrains the size of domestic markets, 
creates perverse economic incentives and sets the stage for political 
instability. The Iberian colonial legacy of embedded inequality in Latin 
America has created institutional barriers to the participation of larger 
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proportions of the population in the growth process. This inequality is 
the latent source for the periodic emergence of populist movements, 
which have followed growth-destroying policies. On the other hand, 
radical land reform in both China and Taiwan created a more equal initial 
situation in the fifties which was conducive to subsequent growth. 
• Political stability and the emergence of pacified nation-states.
Political pacification and the emergence of stable nation-states is 
one of the most important ultimate sources of economic growth. As 
emphasized by Max Weber, without a stable national monopoly of the 
means of violence, centralisation and standardisation of regulation 
within the nation-state, the predictability which is required for long-
term investment and entrepreneurship is lacking. Political instability, 
wars and ethnic conflict are amongst the most important sources of 
economic stagnation, as evidenced by current conflicts in Somalia, 
Sudan, Pakistan, Iraq and Congo, to name but a few examples.
The present sources of economic stagnation in many African and 
Asian countries are not primarily economic in nature. Rather they 
refer to the absence of political centralisation, standardisation and the 
evolution of a stable national monopoly on the means of violence. Both 
cross-country regression studies and historical studies point to the 
overwhelming importance of the existence of a stable national political 
framework for economic activity.
In Africa, borders only recently drawn by colonial rulers in the late 
nineteenth century frequently do not coincide with cultural and ethnic 
traditions. The legitimacy of the central state institutions in multi-
ethnic states is weak. The instability of present-day states in turn is 
also influenced by pre-colonial political history. Though more and more 
is being discovered about ancient African empires, we conclude that 
the degree of political centralisation in African history was far weaker 
than in other historical settings. The impact of central rule on everyday 
life was more modest and large numbers of people lived in tribal and 
acephalic political settings. One of the key factors distinguishing Latin 
America and in particular Asia from Africa is a far longer and more 
pervasive historical experience with centralised political rule.
The lack of internal stability in African states is compounded by 
external intervention by outside powers each supporting their ethnic 
clients and exacerbating internal conflict. Thus, for much of the post-war 
period Africa was the arena of cold-war conflict by proxy. Since the end 
of the cold war, African nations themselves have increasingly intervened 
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in other African countries (e.g. in Congo, and West Africa). 
• The quality of political institutions. 
Where the legitimacy of state institutions and the nation-state is weak, 
the stage is set for the emergence of states which rule on behalf of 
specific ethnic groups or class interests. In such settings, state economic 
policy is almost exclusively aimed at maintaining the power of the 
ruling group or class, at the expense of other segments of society. For 
Africa, the term ‘predatory state’ has been coined for political systems 
which are almost exclusively oriented to keep the strong man in power, 
such as Mobutu’s Zaire or Zimbabwe’s Mugabe. Other observers refer 
to these phenomena as the ‘neo-patrimonial state’ (Sandbrook, 1986; 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997)). 
The predatory state is an extreme pole of the dimension of the quality 
of political governance. The quality of state institutions also depends on 
bureaucratic capabilities, the degree of insulation of the bureaucracy 
from pressure groups (e.g. South Korea as a positive example) and the 
regulative burden claimed for governments. One of the most interesting 
paradoxes of post-war socio-economic development is the existence of 
weak states with disproportionately heavy economic tasks and a wide 
range of discretionary powers. The absence of bureaucratic traditions 
and experience, low remuneration, the use of the state apparatus as 
an instrument for holding on to power and the discretionary powers 
all contributed to the institutionalisation of corruption. The present 
worldwide shift towards a more limited role for the state in economic 
development should not interpreted solely in economic terms, but 
against this wider backdrop op potentially venal state institutions. From 
this perspective, the present resurgence of structuralist theories calling 
for renewed interventionism and state activism should be viewed 
critically. 
 
• Corruption
In cross-country regressions, corruption is often identified as a key 
institutional determinant of economic development. But, differences 
in corruption cannot explain why some countries stagnate and others 
develop. In some economies the proceeds of corruption are reinvested 
productively. In others they are stashed in Swiss banks, or frittered away 
on golden shoes or golden palaces. Nigeria has been emasculated by 
corruption, but corruption under the new order of Suharto in Indonesia 
was compatible with thirty years of dynamism, between 1966 and 1997. 
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It is a major puzzle why the Suharto regime responded so effectively 
to the economic crisis of 1984, in spite of widespread corruption, while 
corruption contributed to an inadequate Indonesian policy response 
to the Asian crisis of 1997 (Temple, 2003). The Texan robber barons 
of the nineteenth century were deeply corrupt, but nonetheless very 
dynamic. China’s pervasive corruption does not stand in the way of its 
impressive economic dynamics. On the basis of these examples one 
might somewhat provocatively advance the proposition that some types 
of corruption are economically sustainable. 
As an aside, it is customary to criticise developing countries for their 
pervasive corruption, but this often rather hypocritical and paternalistic. 
In the Western capitalist economies large-scale corruption has been 
institutionalised in the form of the extortionate mutual remuneration 
by small clique of top managers and directors, who are accountable to no 
one. They siphon away immense riches in the form of bonuses and stock 
options that have no relation to risk or performance whatsoever. This 
enrichment proceeds at the expense of the customers, the shareholders, 
employees, the firms and society at large. The main difference with 
developing countries is that these managers operate within the law. 
They have succeeded in legalising their corrupt practices. This does 
not show up on the corruption indexes of transparency international. 
Though the case of Enron amply illustrates the destructive effects of this 
kind of institutionalised corruption, it has so far not formed a serious 
obstacle to the dynamics of the leading economies.
• Democracy and economic development.
 There is a highly charged debate about the relationship between 
democratic institutions and economic development. Is democratisation 
a factor contributing to economic development, or is it an obstacle? 
There are examples of democratic countries such as India which have 
achieved a measure of economic success in the post-war period, but 
there are just as many examples of dictatorial or autocratic states with 
strong development drives, such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, 
China or Vietnam in the post-war period. Autocratic states potentially 
allow for the insulation of economic policy making from pressure groups 
and interest groups, such as was the case in South Korea.
It is sometimes argued that democratic politics have a negative effect 
on economic growth in developing countries, because populist measures 
will inhibit long-term processes of accumulation (e.g. Barro, 1996). But, 
autocratic institutions also increase the risk that, in the absence of 
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checks and balances, major policy mistakes will be catastrophic, such 
as in China’s great leap backwards from 1958 to 1960, Mugabe’s single-
handed destruction of the economy of Zimbabwe or North Korea’s 
maintenance of a starving garrison state.
Cross-country regressions provide mixed evidence about the effects 
of democracy on economic development, as seems inevitable with this 
type of econometric research. One of the older survey articles (Helliwell, 
1994) rightly concludes that democracy is neither a prerequisite for nor 
an obstacle to economic development. What causality there is works the 
other way round. As countries advance economically, their citizens tend 
to prefer more democratic institutions. An optimistic interpretation of 
this finding is that while democracy is not a condition for economic 
development, there is no reason why successfully developing economies 
could not become more democratic.
• Institutions
Institutions and institutional quality are increasingly mentioned as 
important determinants of development. But it is hard to go beyond 
description and examples to generalise about how institutions affect 
growth and development. The most general formulation is still that 
of North and Thomas (1973), who argue that institutions that align 
individual interests with social welfare are conducive to economic 
development. In their analysis, well-defined property rights have been 
crucial for Western European economic development. The extent to 
which property rights are protected depends in turn on the balance 
between state power and the power of entrepreneurial groups. 
State formation and state power are important in establishing and 
maintaining property rights, but excessive state power will stifle 
entrepreneurial freedoms. Other important innovations with regard to 
property rights focus on the emergence of joint stock companies, which 
limit individual risk and liabilities. 
Property rights affect both rates of accumulation and rates of 
innovation. Without well-defined and well-enforced property rights, 
entrepreneurial individuals have little incentive to take a long view and 
to invest in future growth. In the same way, protection of intellectual 
property rights allows inventors to enjoy the fruits of their innovative 
efforts. However, the focus on protection of intellectual property rights 
has also been criticised. Some types of innovation are based more 
on collective invention, than individually patented inventions. Thus, 
there seem to be alternative ways to align individual interests with 
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collective growth and dynamism. Also some types of accumulation can 
successfully be performed by states rather than by private entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, the focus of North and Thomas on alignment or 
misalignment of incentives through economic institutions continues to 
be a very promising line of analysis. 
• Cultural Factors: Work ethic, savings and entrepreneurship
Though monocausal cultural explanations of development which relate 
economic development to specific religions or cultures have largely been 
debunked, one can identify some common attitudinal characteristics 
in successful developers, which are rooted in culture. These elements 
include a strong work ethic and social discipline, a high value placed on 
education and learning, attitudes conducive to high savings rates, low 
levels of risk aversion and positive attitudes towards entrepreneurship. 
Both Protestantism and the Confucian ethic value sobriety, hard work 
and savings.
Thus, attitudes can evolve in very different religious and cultural 
contexts, such as Puritan Protestantism, modernistic Islam or 
Confucianism, but they do seem to be important in the context of 
economic development. Of course, cultural traits are neither exogenous, 
nor immutable. When incentives change and new opportunities arise, 
older cultural adaptations to economic stagnant circumstances will 
start to change. But, cultural traits do emerge from very long historical 
experiences and adaptations and change only slowly. 
The role of extended family ties in economic development illustrates 
the ambiguity of cultural factors. On the one hand, there is a large 
older literature focusing on the negative influence of extended family 
obligations on entrepreneurship and investment. Entrepreneurial success 
results in redistributive obligations which are an obstacle to further 
entrepreneurial success. On the other hand, there is a recent literature 
on the positive functions of family ties in East Asia as a resource for 
capital accumulation and entrepreneurship.  
• Cultural factors: Developmental drive
In historical examples of successful catch up, a factor which comes to 
the fore is ‘developmental drive’. This refers to an interplay between 
political elites who define developmental goals (as the Meiji reformers 
in Japan, the leaders of China’s present capitalist drive, Suharto’s new 
order, or a variety of post-war nationalist regimes) and feelings of 
national pride and resentment at the present position of the nation in 
Explaining Success and Failure in Development46
the international order. 
• Cultural factors: Openness to the outside world
One of the key cultural attitudes favourable to successful development 
is openness to the outside world. This involves a willingness and 
eagerness to acquire and assimilate technology and knowledge from 
leading countries in the world economy, whichever they are. When a 
society turns inwards and rejects outside influences as either inferior 
or too threatening, or when a society cultivates too much resentment 
against these influences, it will tend to stagnate. Such attitudes help 
explain the loss of momentum of the early European leaders Portugal 
and Spain from the sixteenth century onwards when religion became 
dogmatic and anti-scientific, the long centuries of Chinese stagnation 
after the fourteenth century, China’s failure to catch up in the late 
nineteenth, early twentieth century, as opposed to Japanese success, 
and economic stagnation in the post-war Middle Eastern world.13 
But it is not clear whether the openness to the outside world is 
a deep-seated cultural trait of a country’s whole population. Rather, 
openness tends to depend on cultural traits of dominant elites. When 
China turned inward in the fifteenth century, this was primarily the 
outcome of a power struggle between the court mandarins and the 
eunuch admirals, which was won by the former.
• Climate, soil conditions and energy and mineral resources
Geographic determinists such as Jeffrey Sachs (2004) and Jared 
Diamond (1998) argue that geographic factors such as climate, soil 
conditions, mineral locations and distance from continental coastline 
are important ultimate determinants of growth and stagnation. Thus, 
moderate climate, location on the seaboard, fertile soils and resources 
such as coal, oil, gas or minerals are seen as determining the chances of 
developmental success. 
The claims for geography are overstated in the context of the modern 
world. Geographic conditions do not determine success or failure in 
development. For every factor mentioned by the determinists, there 
are powerful counterexamples. Nowadays, many tropical countries and 
regions with intemperate climates show very rapid growth. Resource 
poor countries such as Japan and Korea have experienced spectacular 
catch up. There are many examples of very prosperous landlocked 
13  In this sense, the present revival of flat-earth thinking and anti-Darwinian religious funda-
mentalism in the USA bodes badly for future US economic leadership.
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economies such as Switzerland, Austria, Southern Germany or Botswana 
and of stagnating seaboard economies such as Eritrea or Zambia. In the 
post-war period, oil riches have more often been a negative source of 
growth than a positive one.
In his more nuanced formulation of proximate and ultimate causality, 
Rodrik argues that geographic conditions are part of ultimate causality, 
because they determine the geographic conditions that people in 
a country have to grapple with. Thus they influence the path of 
development a country follows. Policies and human actions have 
somehow or other to take into account location factors, resource 
availability, climatic conditions and soil conditions. But, this does not 
mean that one or another of these factors is a decisive determinant of 
development success of failure in itself. 
• Demographic trends
Demographic trends are important amongst the more ultimate sources 
of economic development. The pace and nature of economic development 
is influenced by population size (the pattern of development of countries 
with large internal markets differs from that of small Island economies), 
population density, rates of population growth and dependency ratios 
which affect rates of capital accumulation. In China and India, vast 
populations result in large internal markets which contribute to 
acceleration of growth once domestic incomes start to increase even 
modestly. In many sub-Saharan African countries, population growth has 
exceeded growth of GDP since 1973, resulting in stagnating per capita 
incomes. Population growth has also exceeded the rate of technological 
change in agriculture. As a result diminishing returns to traditional 
agricultural practices have resulted in stagnation of food production.
Demographic trends, by the way, illustrate the circularity of processes 
of development. Demographic trends affect economic development in 
a variety of ways, through labour supply, age structure and pressure on 
resources. But, economic development and social modernisation in turn 
result in a reduction of birth rates and a slowdown in population growth, 
which create windows of opportunity before the aging of populations 
starts exerting negative effects on growth prospects.
Ester Boserup has made a convincing case for the importance of 
demographic trends as driver of economic growth and technological 
change (Boserup, 1995, 1981). Her argument, in a nutshell, is that 
increasing population densities with given production technologies 
result in increasing pressure on resources and diminishing returns. 
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They also create incentives for technological advance and intensive 
cultivation practices in agriculture and technological change in general, 
which may more than counteract diminishing returns. Success in 
development occurs when the localised race between technological 
change and population growth is won by technology. Factor proportions 
may influence both the nature of economic development and the 
direction of technological changes, as argued by the induced innovation 
hypothesis (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). An example of the importance of 
factor proportions is the way in which surplus labour in East Asia has 
contributed to the success of labour intensive manufacturing. 
Though Boserup argues that the link between population and 
technological growth is weakening since the end of the nineteenth 
century, due to improvements in transport and communication 
technology, it can still be seen to operate in the post-war period. 
Thus, productivity growth in post-war agriculture is primarily found in 
countries with the highest population densities in Asia (India, China, 
Indonesia), while agricultural productivity in low density Africa has 
stagnated. Densely populated urban centres are invariably the locus of 
technological advance.
More generally, the anti-Malthusian argument is that increasing 
pressure on resources creates incentive for technological change, and 
makes technological alternatives in production and energy supply more 
viable.
• The distance to the technological frontier
The distance to the technological frontier should also be seen as one 
of the ultimate sources of growth. The greater the technology gap, the 
greater the potential for rapid catch up. It defines the initial conditions 
for growth and stagnation in the post-war period (Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Abramovitz, 1989).
When there is sufficient technological congruence between the 
technological leaders and followers and social capabilities and absorptive 
capacities are sufficiently developed, countries can experience explosive 
catch up, due to the rapid absorption of technologies developed 
elsewhere. 
Verspagen (1991) has argued that technological potential is not simply 
a linear function of the size of the technology gap. If the technology gap 
becomes too large, technological congruence will decline and, given 
a certain level of social capabilities (learning capabilities, absorptive 
capacity), it becomes more difficult for countries to catch up.
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• Absorptive capacities.
Though knowledge has an inherent tendency to flow and diffuse, catch 
up is not automatic. Otherwise than argued by Veblen, absorption of 
technology is far from easy. It is more than simple imitation. It involves 
effort, creativity, organisational innovation and technological adaptation 
(Fagerberg and Godinho, 2006). Absorbing international knowledge and 
technology requires a highly developed absorptive capacity, which does 
not come free of charge. While lead countries in the world economy 
need to invest in advancing the frontiers of knowledge, follower 
countries in the developing world primarily have to invest in improving 
their absorptive capacities. Only when they start moving closer to the 
technological frontier, will they need to reorient their efforts and policies 
to knowledge production. This has happened in Korea and is presently 
happening in China and India.
One of the reasons why absorption of technology is more than simple 
transfer of technology is that successful technology transfer almost 
always involves adaptation to local circumstances, institutions and 
conditions. Both the mastery and the adaptation of technology require 
considerable effort and skill. And as economic development progresses, 
adaptation is replaced by upgrading and investment in technological 
advance, which requires even more skills.
This notion of the difficulty of absorbing technology explains why 
some countries are able to profit from international technological 
advances, while others cannot and become mired in stagnation. As 
a wide range of authors have emphasized, catch up requires highly 
developed social and technological capabilities. As mentioned above, 
these capabilities in turn depend on the size of the technology and 
productivity gaps. A traditional agricultural economy such as Burkina 
Faso will find it almost impossible to absorb advanced technology from 
the USA, Japan or Europe because the technological distance is simply 
too large.
Successful catch up involves the prior investment in technological 
and social capabilities which allow countries to acquire and master 
international technologies. Social and technological capabilities 
include educational levels, the orientation of education, technical and 
financial skills, a disciplined workforce, institutions which stimulate 
entrepreneurship, and sufficient political and economic stability to make 
risk taking worth while (Abramovitz, 1989). There is also a more micro-
oriented literature deriving from authors as Sanjaya Lall focusing on 
firm level capabilities and efforts (Bell et al., 1982; Lall, 1992, 1996; Romijn, 
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1989). Lall and others distinguish: production capabilities, investment 
capabilities and innovation capabilities which allow firms to adapt and 
further develop technologies. 
The improvement of firm-level capabilities is a microeconomic 
aspect of the macro concept of social capabilities à la Abramovitz. A 
third rapidly growing body of literature which is relevant for absorptive 
capacity is the systems of innovation literature (Lundvall 1992; Nelson, 
1993). Absorptive capacity is not determined only by the some total 
of the capabilities of the micro agents. It is also determined by the 
nature of the interactions between actors (firms, research institutions 
and government agencies) and the institutions influencing these 
interactions. The more effective a system of innovation, the more rapidly 
knowledge will spread within a country and the more effectively will a 
country be able to absorb technology from abroad.
Tapping into Global Technological Advance as a Characteristic of Catch 
up Economies
So, far I have discussed a wide range of proximate, intermediate and 
ultimate factors that affect economic development. At the conclusion of 
this lecture, I would like to select a few elements for further discussion, 
which are of particular importance for our understanding of success 
and failure in development. The argument can be summarised in 
three propositions: 1. technological change is generated in the leading 
economies of the international economic order. 2. Developing countries 
that are able to absorb internationally generated technology can 
profit from the advantages of technological backwardness. They can 
experience accelerated catch up. Countries that are not able to absorb 
technology will tend to fall behind. 3. Differences in absorptive capacity 
account for much of the difference between success and failure in 
economic development in the post-war period.
In the present international order there is great inequality in 
technological efforts. An overwhelming proportion of scientific research 
and research and development activities takes places in the advanced 
economies. Technological change emanates from the lead countries in 
the world economy.
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Table 3: US patent activity, 1990-2004
Year  Patents                     Share of patents granted (%)
  Granted Foreign  Developing Developing
    Patents Country Countries
      Patents excl. S. Korea
1990 99220 46.6 1.1 0.3
1995 113955 43.4 2.8 0.5
2000 176083 44.9 4.8 0.7
2004 181322 48.1 7.0 1.0
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office, TAF Special Report, All Patents, All Types,
January 1977-december 2004
An illustration of this is provided in tables 3 and 4. As indicated in table 
3, almost all patent applications in the USA originate in the advanced 
economies. Excluding South Korea, only 1 per cent of patents granted in 
the USA (the technological leader) in the post-war period originates in 
developing countries. Similar patterns hold for scientific publications. 
Large multinational companies take the lead in innovation. Thus the 
fifty largest multinationals alone account from 26 per cent of all patents 
in the United States. According to estimates by the World Health 
Organisation, 95 per cent of all medical research focuses on health 
problems of the advanced countries (World Bank, 1999).
Table 4 provides information about R&D efforts of larger developing 
countries in the 1990s. Developing countries invest a much lower 
proportion of GDP in research and development (around 0.6%) than the 
advanced economies (around 2.3%). The technological gaps in terms of 
R&D per head of population are even greater. 
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Table 4: R&D Efforts, 1987-2003a
 R&D R&D R&D R&D Scientists
 as % of as % of per capita per capita & Engineers
 GDP GDP PPP internat. $ PPP internat. $ per 100.000
 1987-97 b 1997-2002 1987-97 1997-2002 1990-2003
Average 12 large 0.8 0.8 34.5 59.6 490.0
Asian countries
      China 0.5 1.2 13.0 55.6 633
      South Korea 2.9 2.9 285.0 494.8 2979
Average 7 large 0.5 0.4 33.7 35.1 321
Latin America
Average 23 0.6 120.6 31.9 47.1 384.2
developing
countries     
Average 16 2.1 2.3 438.2 673.4 3785
advanced
economies
Sources:
R&D expenditures developing countries from Unesco Statistical Yearbook (1999). R&D and R&D as 
percentage of GDP in OECD countries from OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Outlook, 1998. Scientists 
and engineers from UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001-2005.
Notes:
a. Latest year in period for which data are available.
b. The definition of R&D in Unesco statistics on developing countries is more inclusive than the statistics for 
OECD countries from the Science Technology and Industry Outlook, 1998, which conform to Frascati manual 
definitions.
Given the location of technological advance, catch up in the post-1950 
globalised economy is only possible if developing countries develop the 
capabilities to acquire, master and adapt international technology. There 
is not a single example of successful catch up since the late nineteenth 
century that did not involve tapping into international technology – e.g. 
Germany, Russia, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China and 
India. The countries that, for some reason or other, are not able or not 
willing to tap into global technology flows, are the countries that are 
falling behind and are becoming marginalised in the world economy.
For this reason, the romantic myth of indigenous or traditional 
technology is potentially dangerous for development. The myth of 
indigenous technology suggests that there exists something like an 
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appropriate, indigenous technology which is more adapted to the needs 
and traditions of the developing countries. Such technologies are usually 
small scale, environmentally friendly, integrated into traditional culture 
and so forth. In the light of the foregoing analysis, this is a recipe for 
economic stagnation. One can think of Mahatma Ghandi's preoccupation 
with small-scale spinning, Mao Zedong’s campaign for backyard steel 
ovens or the Chinese ambivalence towards Western technology around 
1900. But one can also think of present day aid workers’ love of 
small water pumps, solar panels and other ‘appropriate’ technological 
solutions’. I am not arguing that some of these technologies may not 
be useful. I am arguing that they will not provide the momentum for 
growth and catch up that are required to lift millions of people out of 
poverty. 
The myth of indigenous technology disregards the fact that 
economic catch up is a vast and cataclysmic process involving rapid and 
destructive economic and technological change. If one travels through 
present-day South East Asia, one see whole provinces being dug up and 
restructured.
In developing countries with fairly well-developed social and 
technological capabilities there are ample opportunities for rapid catch 
up. If such capabilities are weak or completely absent, than countries 
will become increasingly marginalised and exploited. Thus one can 
see the global technology and productivity race as the outcome of 
two contradictory tendencies. Innovation in the lead countries leads to 
increased global inequality and falling behind of developing countries. 
Diffusion and transfer of technology allows for explosive growth and 
catch up in some of the developing countries, with sufficient absorptive 
capacities.
Thus, in a modern interdependent economic order, the factor that 
best distinguishes countries that succeed in catching up, from those 
that do not, are differences in absorptive capacity. The key sources of 
catch up in developing countries are absorptive capacity and ability and 
willingness to tap into global technology. When a country has developed 
the capacity to absorb and adapt technology and has the eagerness and 
drive to do so, it can grow at an astounding rate as evidenced by several 
Asian countries in the post-war period. The Gerschenkronian advantages 
of backwardness allow a country to profit from technological advance, 
without bearing many of the costs and risks. 
Countries that are hesitant to open themselves to global technological 
change and associated outside influences, for political, cultural or 
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religious reasons, do this at their peril, as evidenced by the contrasting 
patterns of development of Japan and China from the late nineteenth 
century till 1950. Either a country goes all out in its attempts to acquire 
and assimilate international technology or it will stagnate. 
 
At first sight, this would again seem to boil down to just another 
of the monocausal explanations, I rejected earlier in this lecture. But 
this is misleading. I have argued that technological advance needs to 
be complemented by a great variety of proximate, intermediate and 
ultimate factors. Also, we saw that there is not one single explanation of 
how absorptive capacities emerge. The evolution of absorptive capacities 
depends on a complicated multicausal mix of ultimate cultural and 
institutional factors and intermediate policy efforts But the focus on 
absorptive capacities and the conditions for tapping into international 
technology flows, helps us in setting our future research priorities in the 
analysis of success and failure in economic development. 
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